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Categorical Ways of Acting




1 I intend to propose the possibility of considering the “conceptual pragmatism” of C. I.
Lewis as  a  useful  epistemological  orientation to discuss the relationship between the
social and the individual, in particular as it is set out in Bourdieu’s sociology of practice.
From a pragmatist point of view, the centrality Bourdieu assigns to the concepts of habit
and of culture as a ‘second nature’ seems important, amounting to a sort of naturalism.
Thus the specific point for which I think Lewis’ epistemology could be taken into account
is the connection between habitus and ‘social schematism,’ which Bourdieu develops in
the wake of Kant while the American philosopher considers concepts and ideas as logical
schemata constructed by the human mind in order to face and deal with experiential
data.
2 I use the term ‘experiential data’ in a broad sense, namely according to the significance
generally given by classical pragmatists to the term ‘experience’ which is, in fact, quite
different  from  that  customarily  implied  in  traditional  empiricism.  To  be  sure,  the
pragmatist usage of this term as a logical/semantic entity which covers both mental and
sensorial  space  marks  an  important  difference  between  pragmatism  and  traditional
empiricism that normally restricts the notion of experience to sense impressions. Most
importantly,  pragmatist  philosophers’  positive  reaction  to  Darwinian  biology  caused
them to emphasize the dynamic feature of any kind of experience, namely of the inter-
active, constructive, and social nature of the relationship between the subject and the
object of experience.1 These features are all well embedded in Lewis’s effort to combine
pragmatism and Kantianism. Accordingly, he is known as an exponent of the 20th century
neo-Kantian trend, in particular as a representative of the contemporary ‘naturalistic’
turn in appraisals of the Kantian a priori that Bourdieu himself seems to support.
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A Dynamic Approach to the a priori Issue
3 The wording “categorical ways of acting” used in the title of this article was coined by
Josiah Royce, a follower of Hegelian idealism, who was highly praised by Clarence Irving
Lewis during his university studies at Harvard. Subsequently, Lewis openly criticized the
neo-Hegelian  solutions  offered  by Royce  to  some  pivotal  epistemological  questions.
Nevertheless,  Lewis decided to borrow Royce’s diction “categorical ways of acting” to
present his own conception of the a priori, which constitutes the distinctive aspect of his
pragmatist theory of knowledge.2
4 It is not easy to assign a univocal label to the work of Lewis. For example, one might ask:
was he a foundationalist  or  a  coherentist,  a  realist  or  an idealist,  an empiricist  or  a
logicist? A new and very strange (or perhaps extravagant) term has been coined by Susan
Haack to define his position “proto-foundherentist,” namely an attempt to amalgamate
foundationalism and coherentism, which in fact are normally considered to be deeply
discordant.3 Nor does it seem easy to localize Lewis’s epistemology in one of the two great
currents of the philosophical tradition, empiricism and rationalism. Rather, according to
my interpretative hypothesis, the main reason why his work is interesting is precisely for
its  commitment  to  overcome  the  classical  dichotomy  empirical/rational,  providing
arguments that support the pragmatist project of establishing the criterion of action and
the  social  dimension  of  knowledge  as  antidotes  to  the  sceptical  implications  of
empiricism, on the one hand, and to the rationalist pretensions of certainty or absolute
epistemic grounds, on the other. In any event, Lewis does not hesitate to count himself
among the pragmatists, declaring more than once his debt to the thought of James and
Peirce and, above all, characterizing the theory of knowledge presented in his best known
work, Mind and the World Order,4 ‘conceptual pragmatism.’  Yet Lewis’  is an anomalous
pragmatism with regard to the important positions of both the ‘founding fathers’ of this
trend of thought, and of the neo-pragmatist philosophers.
5 In particular, Lewis’ epistemology certainly draws upon the fundamental factor of the
work of Peirce and James, namely, their insistence upon the epistemic value of action.
Nevertheless,  Lewis’  perspective diverges from that of Peirce and James regarding an
aspect that is  equally essential,  i.e.  the Kantian problem of the a priori conditions of
experience. As we know, Peirce and James maintained a quite negative attitude towards
the very possibility of the a priori as governing structural, universal, and necessary forms
of  the  mind.5 Lewis  agreed  with  such  an  attitude  but,  unlike  Peirce  and  James,  he
attempted  to  argue  that  knowing  activities  are  based  upon  conceptual  frameworks
established by thought independently of experience and consisting of sets of analytic
truths that, however, are susceptible to change.
6 The a priori issue was also a key problem for logical positivism. Together with Charles
Morris and John Dewey, Lewis was one of the most assiduous American interlocutors of
the logical empiricists, with whom he initially found considerable harmony In particular,
he agreed with the logical empiricists on a crucial point, that is, the negation of synthetic
a priori judgements. However, Lewis’ philosophy of language diverged significantly with
respect  to  a  number  of  neo-positivist  claims,  first  of  all  the  assertion  of  a  possible
linguistic  version of  the  a  priori.  These  divergences  would  be  useful  when clarifying
Lewis’s  specific  position  among  promoters  of  the  so  called  ‘liberalization’  of  logical
empiricism, and in particular his relationship with Quine, who attended Lewis’ doctoral
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courses at Harvard. At the same time, it is important to consider that, in spite of some
interesting affinities between the two philosophers, Lewis was surely one of the targets of
Quine’s famous attack on the analytic/synthetic dichotomy.
7 The works by Lewis in the field of mathematical logic are usually considered the least
important  part  of  his  philosophical  legacy  but,  in  fact,  they  are  the  basis  of  his
epistemological stance and, more specifically, of the pragmatic version of the a priori he
advanced  in  later  years.  To  summarize  as  much  as  possible,  one  can  say  that  the
pragmatic version of the a priori is linked to the pivotal assertion of Lewis’ mathematical
logic, namely that logical implication consists of an intensional relationship and is not an
extensional aspect of inference as was commonly considered. More precisely, Lewis aimed
at recovering the semantic level of logic and for this reason he rejected the criterion of
‘material implication’ presented as a paradigm of the deductive inference in Russell’s and
Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica.6 According to Lewis, such a criterion does not take into
account the fact that our usual way of making a deducing consists of the construction of a
relationship based upon the meaning of the proposition’s premises and its consequences,
and  not  only  upon  their  formal  truth  or  falsity  value,  as  Russell’s  principle  in  fact
indicated. Indeed, this criticism is an essential aspect of Lewis’s conception of the a priori
since  it  is  based  upon  the  notion  of  necessary  truth  and  the  correlated  distinction
between analytic truths and synthetic truths, which Lewis proposed in his 1923 essay, A
Pragmatic  Conception  of  the  A  Priori.  In  a  nutshell,  this  essay  foregrounds  a  dynamic
approach to the transcendental issue that takes advantage of current developments in
physical science and mathematics. Here is an illuminating passage:
The  conception  of  the  a  priori points  to  two  problems  which  are  perennial  in
philosophy: the part played in knowledge by the mind itself, and the possibility of
“necessary truth” or of  knowledge “independent of  experience.”  But traditional
conceptions  of  the  a  priori  have  proved  untenable.  […]  The  difficulties  of  the
[traditional] conception are due, I believe, to two mistakes: whatever is a priori is
necessary, but we have misconstrued the relation of necessary truth to mind; and
the a priori is independent of experience, but in so taking it, we have misunderstood
its  relation  to  empirical  fact.  What  is  a  priori is  necessary  truth  not  because  it
compels  the  mind’s  acceptance,  but  precisely  because  it  does  not.  It  is  given
experience, brute fact, the a posteriori element in knowledge which the mind must
accept willy-nilly. The a priori represents an attitude in some sense taken freely, a
stipulation of the mind itself, and a stipulation which might be made in some other
way if it suited our bent or need. (Lewis 1923: 231)
8 In other words, the a priori are instruments created by the human mind to organize the
events of experience or the criteria that we decide to use to define and classify them,
choosing from a series of “conceivable alternatives” that in any case do not alter the
reality of the given. In fact, according to Lewis, the a priori does not anticipate the given
but  simply  our  attitude  towards  it,  an  attitude  the  validity  of  which  is  measured
pragmatically, that is, in relation to the normative function that the a priori propositions
perform within reasoning processes, as well as in relation to their ability to deal with the
complexity of empirical data. For this reason, we can certainly share the traditional idea
that the a priori is typically represented by the laws of logic considered as analytic truths.
But we should also be aware that there is, in principle, an infinity of logical systems, that
is to say, it is possible to construct alternative systems, each one based upon different
formal criteria, and this requires searching for the confirmation of their validity beyond
the field of logic. Hence, for Lewis, the ultimate criteria of logical laws are pragmatic and
the necessity of the a priori principles require “neither universal agreement nor complete
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historical continuity.” In fact, “Conceptions, as those of logic, which are least likely to be
affected by the opening of new ranges of experience, represent the most stable of our
categories; but none of them is beyond the possibility of alteration”:
The  dividing  line  between  the  a  priori and  the  a  posteriori is  that  between  the
principles and the definitive concepts which can be maintained in the face of all
experience and those genuinely empirical generalizations which might be proven
flatly false. The thought which both rationalism and empiricism have missed is that
there  are  principles,  representing  the  initiative  of  mind,  which  impose  upon
experience no limitations whatever, but that such conceptions are still subject to
alteration  on  pragmatic  grounds  when the  expanding  boundaries  of  experience
reveal their infelicity as intellectual instruments. (Lewis 1923: 239-40)7
9 The dynamic nature of the mind is also translated, therefore, into the realm of concepts,
of principles, of categories, of definitions – all terms that Lewis uses interchangeably and
characterizes as “distinctly social products.” They are rooted in the basic shared abilities
and needs of human beings, in language, in the exchange of ideas and experiences, finally
“in the coincidence of human purposes and the exigencies of human cooperation.” Mind
and the World Order confirms this perspective by offering a set of argumentations which
aim at clarifying the distinction between empirical data and the a priori dimension. Some
ambiguities on the matter appear unresolved, however the essential point of previous
discussion remains: 
The  a  priori  is  not  a  material  truth,  delimiting  or  delineating  the  content  of
experience as such, but is definitive or analytic in its nature. (MWO: 231)
10 Lewis repeats that, whilst a priori propositions are products of the mind and are thus
susceptible to change, they are not arbitrary. Rather, they respond to criteria of self-
consistency8 which also reflect upon the rules of their application, as he indicates in this
passage:
The paradigm of the a priori in general is the definition. It has always been clear
that the simplest and most obvious case of truth which can be known in advance of
experience  is  the  explicative  proposition  and  those  consequences  of  definition
which can be derived by purely logical analysis. These are necessarily true, true
under all possible circumstances, because definition is legislative. Not only is the
meaning assigned to words more or less a matter of choice […] but the manner in
which the  precise  classifications  which definition  embodies  shall  be  affected,  is
something  not  dictated  by  experience.  If  experience  were  other  than  it  is,  the
definition and its corresponding classification might be inconvenient, useless, or
fantastic, but it could not be false. Mind makes classifications and determines meanings;
in  so  doing,  it  creates  that  truth  without  which  there  could  be  no  other  truth. (MWO:
239-40)
 
Epistemological Triangulation: Schemas, Actions, and
Reality
11 The assertion of the ‘determining’ power that classifications or a priori concepts exert
upon the meanings we assign to experiences suggests a quite solid relativism or even an
idealist perspective, which actually seems to be confirmed by Lewis’s claims concerning a
strict  connection between conceptual  schemes and the definitions of  what  is  real  or
unreal.  Indeed,  there  are  a  number  of  passages  in  his  work  that  consider  not  only
meanings and empirical or practical truths, as suggested in the above quotation, but also
definitions of reality as dependent upon the concepts we use. “Decisions on reality and
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unreality  are  themselves  interpretations  involving  principles  of  the  same  order  as
scientific  law,”  he  writes,  and  “whatever  is  denominated  ‘real’  must  be  something
discriminated in the experience by criteria which are antecedently determined” (MWO:
261).  However, ‘conceptual pragmatism’ also emphasizes the decisive role of practical
experience in determining what can be taken for ‘real’ or ‘unreal’ in a quite strong or
metaphysical sense:
Our  categories  are  guides  to  action.  Those  attitudes  which  survive  the  test  of
practice  will  reflect  not  only  the  nature  of  the  active  creature  but  the  general
character of the experience he confronts. (MWO: 21)
12 To sum up these two apparently different argumentations, what we define as real implies
or,  more precisely,  implements our conceptual  schemes but these latter are,  in turn,
normative categories whose commitments must be interrelated with genuine realities,
since otherwise they would not work at all as classifications/definitions that – according
to Lewis – aim at meeting our needs and purposes.9
13 It would be worth confronting such a perspective with Wittgenstein’s conception of the
normative system that supports our linguistic and epistemic practices, that complex of
shared certainties  forming the  ‘common sense’  which Wittgenstein  represented with
metaphors of the ‘river-bed’ and ‘scaffolding’ to describe the grounding function they
perform with respect  to  events  that  affect  our  knowledge.10 In  particular,  the  pages
dedicated to this issue suggest a notion of reality that appears in part similar to that of
Lewis  in  so  far  as  they  share  an  epistemological  attitude  aimed  at  overcoming  the
traditional counter-position of realism and anti-realism. More specifically, in his well-
known polemic against Moore’s conception of common sense, Wittgenstein maintained
(similarly to Lewis’s statements concerning the empirical independence of categorical
laws) that the certainties of which common sense proves to be composed do not have true
empirical justification. They do not, therefore, constitute knowledge but rather, have a
function  similar  to  that  of  the  rules  of  a  game.  Obviously,  this  is  a  very  important
function.  Common  sense  beliefs  are  “the  inherited  background  against  which  I
distinguish between true and false” (OC: § 94), and this set of beliefs is similar to “a kind
of mythology” shaped by “propositions describing this world picture,” and which are
adhered to irrespective of the question of their empirical correctness (OC: § 95). This is
like saying that what counts is not the correspondence of such images to some ‘true’
reality, but rather the fact itself that they exist, and this, in turn, means neither more nor
less than that they function in the practice of language.
14 According to Wittgenstein, just as a person normally learns the basic rules of living in a
particular natural and social environment by putting them into practice, the images of
the world that function as a backdrop to our language games are not necessarily the
subject of explicit teaching. They can be learned “purely practically” (OC: § 95). They
form “a system” which “belongs to the essence of what we call an argument,” that is:
“The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments
have their life” (OC: § 105). In what manner or on the basis of what ‘principle’ the beliefs
of common sense and their normative force take form is a question that Wittgenstein
takes out a possible definition in the traditional sense, and this is in fact a strong obstacle
to any attempt to classify him among the realists or the anti-realists. Indeed, this very
possibility depends, more or less implicitly, upon an assumption typical of traditional
foundationalism, that is to say, on the search for an absolute primum of our cognitive
abilities, whether of a logical-rational nature or of an empirical-sensory nature.
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15 This is an assumption which not only Wittgenstein but most of contemporary thought has
shown to be impracticable, and my interpretative hypothesis is that Lewis and the other
classical pragmatists attempted to contribute to such a philosophical attitude.11 Of course,
Wittgenstein’s  epistemology  is  very  ambiguous  and,  in  particular,  it  must  be
acknowledged  that  his  wording  is  often  extraneous  to  Wittgenstein’s  philosophical
vocabulary. Most importantly, it is not immediately evident that Lewis’s conception of
categorical laws matches the set of certainties underlying common sense discussed by
Wittgenstein, and it is questionable that the latter would fully share Lewis’s idea of the
‘creative’ capacity of human thought. However, focusing upon the differences between
them, in addition to the analogies of their theoretical perspectives, could be a fruitful
strategy to explore the intertwining of conceptual schemas, actions, and reality, which
the American philosopher continues to do in his  own version of  Pragmatism. In any
event,  such  an  intertwining  should  be  accounted  as  a  theoretical  framework  for
reshaping the issue of the relationship between sociality and individuality that is clearly
pivotal for both social sciences and philosophical research. A collaborative attitude on the
matter is actually important for implementing and improving Lewis’s commitment to
observe, describe, and interpret the effective functioning of the philosophical network
constituted by conceptual schemas, actions, and reality. In fact, his perspective includes
an option in favor of the externalist methodology in philosophy that, in principle, tallies
with the methodological attitude that characterizes contemporary social sciences.
16 In any event, it is by virtue of the epistemological triangulation of conceptual schemas,
actions, and reality that Wittgenstein constantly re-asserts the pragmatist idea of the
critical function of philosophy. Philosophy is the “study of the a priori” and its method is
reflexive. It must study the means that we already possess for approaching the facts of
experience and constructing our beliefs. It must investigate the concepts that are shared
by scientific and practical-moral knowledge in order to make them explicit and evaluate
their function within our operations of ordering givenness. Regarding metaphysics, Lewis
considers its principles – ‘physical,’ ‘psychical,’ ‘matter,’ ‘spirit’ – as categories by means
of  which  we  refer  to  different  aspects  of  reality.  The  task  of  metaphysics  is  to
acknowledge them correctly, namely, to state the ‘rules’ by which we distinguish the real
from  the  unreal.  Thus  metaphysical  research  does  not  diverge  from  a  conceptual
pragmatism that properly consists in studying the ‘interpretative rules’ we deliberately
adopt to understand reality and its giveness. But the very notion of ‘givenness’ leads us to
wonder about the second term of the a priori/a posteriori conceptual  couple.  In other




17 The notion of the sensory given is constitutive in Lewis’s epistemology and, above all,
there are many passages in which he supports the priority of the given as an object of
immediate sensory perception. In particular, there is a rather indiscriminate use of the
expression ‘the given,’ which has inevitably been the cause of many different attacks on
Lewis.12 As a matter of fact, one often has the impression that he supported an empirical
translation of  Cartesian foundationalism in addition to  the isolationist  conception of
empirical  knowledge against  which James  and Peirce  had addressed very  substantial
arguments. Nevertheless, Lewis’s familiarity with the thought of James and Peirce is
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anything  but  secondary  to  the  construction  of  his  epistemology.  Moreover,  the
ambiguities  in his  use of  the terms ‘given’  and ‘givenness’  should assume the triadic
structure of  his  theory  of  knowledge,  namely  the  assertion  that  cognitive  processes
include three factors tightly interconnected that can be told apart only for the purpose of
analysis: the given, the concept, and the interpretation of the ‘given’ by means of the concept.
According to this view, the sensory given cannot ever constitute knowledge by itself,
being simply a starting point for cognitive processes, for the construction of propositions
about  objective  reality,  which cannot  be  reduced to any possible  content  of  sensory
experience.
18 It is possible to already discern in A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori and in the 1926
article  The  Pragmatic  Element  of  Knowledge, that  the  definition of  the  three  factors  of
knowledge – the given,  the concept,  and the interpretation – is  an attempt to make
fruitful use of the lesson of Peirce, specifically of his triadic theory of meaning and the
notion of  Generals. In  particular,  the  1926  essay  assigns  importance  to  the  theme of
interpretation and its connection to the pragmatist idea that knowledge has to do with
the problems raised by our needs and interests. These issues are actually set out by Lewis
as the elements that distinguish Pragmatism from Idealism, as well as from ‘mystics’ and
the supporters of ‘pure perception’ à la Bergson. Lewis writes:
Pragmatism is distinguished by the fact that it advances the act of interpretation,
with  its  practical  consequences,  to  first  place.  […]  These  are,  then,  the  bare
fundamentals of the pragmatist position concerning knowledge: that knowledge is
an interpretation, instigated by need or interest, and tested by its consequences in
action, which individual minds put upon something confronting them or given to
them. On any theory, it is to be expected that minds will largely coincide and that
agreement, for various obvious reasons, will be the rule. But the extent and manner
of such coincidence is, for pragmatism, something to be noted in particular cases,
not simply the result of universal human reason. (Lewis 1926: 240-1)
19 The link between the activity of interpretation and the pragmatic aspect of knowledge
prompts us to put aside the idea of ‘pure perception’ of the data of experience. As Lewis
explains in Mind and the World Order, if such an expression means the apprehension of a
pure givenness, it is definitely a philosophical abstraction. Otherwise we would have to
admit something like pure aesthesis, for which there would exist only data isolated in one
unique experience or in a unique state of consciousness that, according to Lewis, are truly
untenable. In any event, such data are not essential on a cognitive level, precisely because
they would be incommunicable. In other words, the given constitutes an essential point
of reference for language and concepts. However, it exceeds their boundaries just because
it promotes them:
In our knowledge of  the external  world,  concepts represent what thought itself
brings to an experience. The other element is ‘the given.’ It represents that part or
aspect  which is  not  affected  by  thought,  the  “buzzing,  blooming confusion,”  as
James called it, on which the infant first opens his eyes.
It is difficult to make a clean separation of what is given in experience from all
admixture of  conceptual  thinking.  The given is  something less  than perception,
since perception already involves analysis and relation in cognition. One cannot
express the given in language, because language implies concepts, and because the
given is just that element which cannot be conveyed from one mind to another, as
the qualia of colour can never be conveyed to the man born blind. But one can, so to
speak, point to the given. (Lewis 1926: 248-9)
20 The given always implies an aspect of privacy but this is not important for the purposes
of knowledge precisely because, for Lewis, this aspect coincides with immediacy and the
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mere immediate given of experience “is never what we mean by knowledge” (Lewis 1926:
249). This is actually the outline of the basic criteria of a behaviourist theory of meaning,
whose pivotal point is the concept of connotation rather than that of reference.13
21 Overall, the remarks on the question of meaning, to which An Analysis of Knowledge and
Valuation is mostly dedicated, constitute a development of preceding Lewis studies of the
intensional aspect of logic. In this respect, the distinction between “terminating” and
“non terminating” judgements is  particularly interesting.  It  is  a distinction meant to
differentiate the present meaning from the possible meaning of linguistic expressions,
and  thus  to  reassessing  critically  the  dichotomies  of  factual  judgement  and  value
judgement, of descriptive and normative supported by the neo-positivists, especially by
Carnap in Philosophy and Logical Syntax and by Schlick in Problems of Ethics. In a nutshell,
Lewis’s  thesis  is  that  value  judgements  operate  in  the  entire  area  of  normativity,
including the logical determinations of coherence and cogency, as well as definitions of
truth. Certainly, moral judgements or assertions on the ‘good’ must not be confused with
those regarding what is normatively ‘right’ or valid in the scientific field. But this does
not authorize us to use moral assertions as purely emotional expressions. It is thus easy
to guess why Lewis never matched the neo-positivist approach to the question of the
relationship between factual judgement and value judgement:
The validity of cognition itself is inseparable from that final test of it which consists
in some valuable result of the action which it serves to guide. Knowledge – so the
pragmatist conceives – is for the sake of action; and action is directed to realization
of what is  valuable.  If  there should be no valid judgments of value,  then action
would be pointless or merely capricious, and cognition would be altogether lacking
in significance. (Lewis 1926: 112)
22 One can also trace the distinction between linguistic meaning and “sense meaning” back
to the debate with Carnap, through which Lewis confirmed his reluctance to embark
upon the path of conventionalism opened up by some promoters of the ‘linguistic turn.’
According to Murphey, the concept of ‘sense meaning’ has the advantage of offering a
justification for the connection of conceptual schemes with the experience of the senses.
14 It  is  just  at  that  level  that  a  comparison  with  Bourdieu’s  notion  of  ‘perceptions’
schemata’ seems interesting. In fact, in both cases what is at the stake is the necessity of
mediating between sensorial experience and the conceptual level.
 
Analytic Truths and “Sense Meaning”: Epistemic
Tensions and Potentialities
23 Summarizing drastically Lewis’s position is a question of opposing the idea that analytic
truths establish relationships only among linguistic terms. Rather, as he restates, analytic
truths also involve the ‘sense meaning,’ that is to say, some reference to the concreteness
of empirical facts, just because this allows us to safeguard the objective nature of the
relationships between concepts and reality we normally assume in our ordinary course of
cognitive  activity.  However,  this  does  not  imply  any  devaluation  of  the  function  of
language’s conventional aspect within scientific practices, nor, more generally, does it
mean underestimating the linguistic nature of thought. Rather, Lewis’ s purpose was to
guarantee the epistemological function of the intensional component of language. In this
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regard, it is useful to recall the four different ways of meaning presented in his 1946
work:
1. The denotation of a term is the class of all actual things to which the term applies.
2. The comprehension of  a term is the classification of  all  possible or consistently thinkable
things to which the term would be correctly applicable.
3. The signification of a term is that property in things the presence of which indicates that the
term correctly applies; and the absence of which indicates that it does not apply.
4. Formally considered, the intension of a term is to be identified with the conjunction of all
other terms each of which must be applicable to anything to which the given term would be
correctly applicable (Lewis 1946: 39).
24 There is certainly a remarkable difference between the first three forms of meaning and
the fourth, which simply corresponds to ‘sense meaning.’ It is a difference the importance
of which is essential from an epistemological point of view, since it consists precisely in
the  primacy  assigned  to  the  ‘sense  meaning’  regarding  the  verification  of cognitive
propositions. In fact, one must necessarily make reference to the intension of a term
when  the  test  of  verification  of  cognitive  assertions  implies  a  test  of  significance/
denotation or when the empirical difference is called for showing meaning’s differences;
In addition, the intensional aspect of linguistic terms is basic with respect to operational
meaning, which constitutes a standard for the precision and acceptability of concepts. It
is not by chance that Lewis refers to Kant, asserting that “a sense meaning, when precise
and explicit, is a schema; a rule or prescribed routine and an imagined result of it which
will determine applicability of the expression in question” (Lewis 1946: 134-7). But, of
course, every schema, as such, is flexible, namely changeable according to experience
data.
25 The flexibility of ‘sense meaning’ schemas is nothing but a corollary of the constructive
‘stuff’  that  characterizes  any  concept.  In  fact,  the  proper  function  of  concepts  is  to
arrange for the classification and discrimination of experience data, namely to organize
their “buzzing blooming confusion” according to a certain operational meaning (Lewis
1926: 250), which, in turn, consists of a set of regularities that allows us to draw our
attention to certain aspects of experience and to guide our behaviour. In other words,
concepts are mental habits, to use Peirce’s vocabulary, or dispositions to understand any
sort of experience, logical or empirical. and, most importantly, to anticipate the possible
results (or ‘conceivable consequences,’ in Peirce’s terms) of a certain cognitive approach
to our physical and cultural world. In so far as the anticipatory function of a concept can
be more or less successfully satisfied by concrete actions and practices, concepts can be
corroborated, amended, or even rejected. Thus Lewis reiterates the typically pragmatist
intertwining of concepts, behavioural habits, and norms, insisting upon their reciprocal
dynamic essence which ultimately appears strictly connected to the dynamic essence of
both human experience and rational activity, in short, to the auto-corrective power of
human intelligence that Peirce strictly connected to the ‘teaching power’ of experience.
26 Lewis’s conception of ‘sense meaning’ has been variously criticized. One of the most well-
known comments  was  that  of  A. J. Ayer,  who emphasized the  difficulties  of  applying
‘sense  meaning’  to  abstract  entities  (photons,  for  example)  or  to  sensible  qualities
(bitterness), and also to moral terms. But one could object that Ayer did not do justice to
Lewis, because the concept of the ‘image’ upon which Lewis’s theory of ‘sense meaning’ is
based is strictly tied to the criteria of action, so that what is imagined is in reality a series
of possible actions. Moreover, it is opportune to note that ‘sense meaning’ corresponds in
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part to the ineffable element of sensory experience mentioned earlier, namely to Lewis’s
assertion  that  there  is  something  pre-linguistic  and  yet  necessary  for  knowledge,
something that we try to describe by means of language, granting the impossibility of
translating it into conclusive words. According to ‘conceptual pragmatism,’ this does not
mean supporting solipsism, but rather asserting the ‘social construction’ of reality and, at
the same time,  refusing the traditional causal  theory of perception in the name of a
pragmatic,  interactive  theory of  knowledge and language.  Last  but  not  least,  Lewis’s
epistemology makes room for an interesting approach to the problem of the relationship
between human social habits and individual experience. Indeed, one could say that it is
just  the  ineffable  element  of  sensory  experience,  the  actual  effective  source  of  the
pragmatic  a  priori.  Since  humans  cannot  properly  share  their  own  immediate
experiences through language, concepts are necessary in order to comprehend whether
the meaning of my personal experience is similar or dissimilar to the experience of the
same thing or fact that another person has. Accordingly, concepts helps us to understand
the extent to which any possible difference on that level affects the way each person
accepts, practices, and ‘feels’ social habits. Again, what is critical in such a process of
understanding  is  human  behaviour.  Concepts  are  in  themselves  guides  for  human
conduct, that is, they are signs of potential future actions. However, we can understand
another person’s mental store only by observing their practical and linguistic behaviour,
the way in which their mental sets are implemented, experienced, and finally confronted
with those of  others.  Such a systematic commitment may cast  light upon habits and
‘social schematism’ – after Bourdieu, not necessarily in order to support the importance
of  social  conventions  or  political  agreements,  but  to  value  differences  as  productive
rather than destructive of human potential. This is probably one of the very points of
necessary connection between research in philosophy or the social sciences, providing
that in any pragmatist account of human reality, ‘mental’ and ‘behavioural’ as well as
‘social’ and ‘individual’ are dynamically interconnected.
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NOTES
1. I tried to show the complexity of classical pragmatism’s notion of experience in Calcaterra
2003 and Calcaterra 2011.
2. Lewis (1923: 231).
3. Haack 1996.
4. Lewis also recognized the influence of the naturalistic logic of John Dewey.
5. I sketched Peirce’s critiques of Kant in Calcaterra 2013b.
6. Russell, Whitehead 1910.
7. See also (MWO: 19-25).
8. See (MWO: 237, 245).
9. On Lewis’s commitment to realism, see Järvilehto 2014.
10. See (OC: §§ 94-105).
11. For a synthetic account of a possible integration of Wittgenstein’s overcoming of the realism-
antirealism counterposition  with  Peirce’s  and  James’s  approach  to  the  notion  of  reality,  see
Calcaterra 2013a.
12. An analysis of these instances of ambivalence and their epistemological repercussions can be
found in Gowans 1989.
13. A detailed explanation of this aspect can be found in Murphey (2005:  chap. IV).  See also
O’Shea (2007: chap. 5).
14. Murphey (2005: 270 ff.).
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ABSTRACTS
This  paper  proposes  the  “conceptual  pragmatism”  of  C.  I.  Lewis  as  a  useful  epistemological
orientation  for  studying  the  relationship  between  the  social  and  individual  registers,  in
particular as it is set out in Bourdieu’s sociology of practice. Bourdieu’s concepts of habits based
upon ‘social  schematism’ and of culture as a ‘second nature,’  as well  as Lewis’  conception of
logical schemas constructed by humans are all formulated in the wake of Kant, and mediating
between sensorial  experience and the conceptual  level  is  a  common issue for  Lewis  and the
French sociologist. This paper discusses Lewis’ controversial idea of “sense meaning” in order to
show his commitment to a pragmatic, interactive theory of knowledge and language. Moreover, I
emphasize  Lewis’  intertwining  of  conceptual  schemas,  actions,  and  reality  as  a  theoretical
network for reshaping analysis of the relationship between sociality and individuality according
to  a  pragmatist  perspective,  and  for  implementing  and  improving  Lewis’  commitment  to
observing, describing, and interpreting the effective functioning of conceptual schemas, one that
includes  an option in  favor  of  an  externalist  philosophical  methodology which,  in  principle,
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